On the role of signaling in mitigation of road-traffic congestion:  The price of anarchy of signaling-based strategies in stochastic networks by Massicot, Olivier
c© 2019 by Olivier Massicot. All rights reserved.
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship Repository
ON THE ROLE OF SIGNALING IN MITIGATION OF ROAD-TRAFFIC





Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Aerospace Engineering
in the Graduate College of the





We study the influence of information design on routing in the presence of vagaries, following the canonical
congestion game approach. We allow a central controller to observe nature’s state and make exploit the
information gap between her and the drivers, to cater information to drivers in a most social manner. In
addition to the extreme cases of full and no information, she can also use randomized public signaling and
personal recommendations.
We revisit these programs and raise algorithmic concerns, but most importantly, we revisit Roughgarden’s
celebrated Price of Anarchy (PoA) in uncertain networks. Unexpectedly, no upper bound on the PoA holds
if drivers are kept uninformed in the presence of vagaries, while fully informed drivers perform regularly.
On the other hand, uninformed drivers might outperform informed drivers by a factor equal to the price of
anarchy. Comparing pairwise all information provisions, we establish a table of competitive ratios, which
turn out to only take vales one, the PoA, and infinity.
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Road congestion represents a tremendous loss of time and fuel for drivers. The additional time spent
commuting and the inability to accurately predict travel times are deleterious to business and spare time.
In the United States alone, road traffic congestion is responsible for an estimated annual loss of $305B in
direct and indirect costs, [10], which amounts to a staggering average loss of $930 per capita every year.
Most certainly, mobility is a problem with no single answer. Peak hours reflect a universal demand to
reach work at very particular times, businesses and workers could have a say in this poor synchronization by
proposing more eclectic schedules. The spatial partition of residential and business areas intensifies the use
of personal vehicles on daily commutes, zones of higher densities see a gain from including most necessary
amenities, [36]. Denser and more efficient public transport could alleviate congestion on roads, which could
also benefit from an increased road capacity and an incentivization , however these solution eventually hit
a ceiling and prove to be costly.
Early economics considerations brought to light the inefficiency of selfish routing on road networks [33].
The advent of game theory formalized how a demand of self-minded drivers routes through a network, [41,
4]. Braess’s paradox, conjectured based on this framework [9] and observed in actual occurrences [17, 3, 16,
44], revealed that (1) increasing the capacity of a road network might decrease the welfare of drivers, (2)
most probably many networks are already in the paradox and would gain from the closing of some sections.
More recently, the price of anarchy rose as a measure of the inefficiency lost in competition over coop-
eration in networks [22, 35]. This enabled to quantify the extent of Braess’s paradox, and how much could
a network improved by simply closing lanes. Roughgarden brought a strong negative result on Braess’s
paradox, indicating that closing sections efficiently is a NP-hard problem, [34].
Another means to synchronize or fuidify traffic is thorugh the use of road signals and signage. Historically,
signs were used to guide travelers, but with the advent of cars, were eventually designed to improve safety
and fluidity at intersections. Some studies focus on queueing models at an intersection level [14], while
others take a more holistic approach [40, 42, 19], to optimize dynamic traffic lights. But nowadays, signals
can cater richer information than simple ‘stop and go’ orders, by indicating delays, incidents and jams, via
1
dynamic billboards, radio stations, or even provide optimal paths via on-board routing applications.
Early theoretical studies [5, 6] and empirical observations [25] stirred interest in the transportation
literature for the study of information in routing. The influence of information is rather subtle and sometimes
counterintuitive. For instance, Wu et al. [43] exhibited an example of ‘informational Braess’s paradox’: a
network where drivers aware of more roads than another population, would be outperformed by the unaware
drivers in individual travel time.
Most recently, Das, Kamenica and Mirka, [12], proposed a setting for a central controller to best provide
information through public signals, as well as private information in the form of a recommendation, in an
uncertain context. This is to be seen in parallel with the rise of Bayesian persuasion in economics, owed to
Kamenica and Gentzkow [20]. In this framework, a sender can influence a receiver thanks to the information
gap between them. As a population of competing drivers can be seen as a single player [4], although with
different incentives than individuals, stochastic routing games fall under the umbrella of Bayesian persuasion.
Our topic of interest lies in the study of these recently introduced policies.
We start our study by a chapter entirely dedicated to selfish routing. The approach we will take is based
on congestion games, and relates strongly to game theory, as introduced by Wardrop, Beckman et al. [41,
4]. Broadly speaking, a road network can be modeled as a game, where each driver tries to minimize his
own travel time. This turns the game into a potential game [4], and simplifies the system to the study of
flows on the network. Equilibria of this game ideally represent the actual traffic on the network, and the
sum of travel times of all drivers defines a social cost, an idealized measure sought to be minimized.
We also review the price of anarchy and a negative result related to Braess’ paradox, both introduced
by Roughgarden [35, 34]. We build on the former in a later chapter in the context of stochastic networks
and signaling-based strategies. Finally, we will formulate a sensible best-response dynamics setting which
solidifies the stability of Wardrop equilibria, but could also provide insights on the control of equilibria, if
ever some were more desirable than others.
The following chapter studies how a benevolent controller could best route flows of selfish drivers on
an uncertain network, using her information advantage. We present the two solutions introduced by Das,
Kamenica and Mirka [12], along with their program and examples. We note notably that (1) if Bayesian
persuasion, [20], applies well to the public signaling program, there are still computational challenges, (2)
the private signaling (or personal recommendation) program is not convex.
In the last chapter, we expand the price of anarchy [35] to the stochastic setting laid by Das and coauthors
[12], comparing pair-wise information designs of the previous chapter. We obtain a partial hierarchy between
designs, which indicates that (1) uninformed drivers can perform arbitrarily badly compared to any other
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routing, (2) uninformed drivers might outperform informed drivers by a factor equal to the price of anarchy,




2.1 Routing as a congestion game
In this first section, the reader will find how a road network is canonically modeled as a congestion game
and the general properties of its equilibria. The first subsection is dedicated to the very definition of selfish
routing and introduces a potential which captures equilibria as its minima, in the same vein as the work on
potential games of Monderer and Shapley [30]. The model we will use throughout has become a key tool
to predict how a demand generates flows on a road network. We mostly follow the path first cleared by
Wardrop and Beckmann et al. [41, 4], inspired by early economics concerns [33]. More modern reviews are
available in [8, 34].
2.1.1 Modelling actual routing: Wardrop equilibria
Given the scale of a road network, drivers are often modeled by nonatomic flows, turning a discrete problem
into a continuous one. Instead of counting vehicles, we assume the network is in a quasi-permanent regime,
much like a water network, and reason in terms of flows, namely of entering vehicles per unit of time.
Furthermore, we focus on a specific notion of routing equilibrium, Wardrop Equilbria, which roughly
speaking corresponds to drivers each taking their shortest path, assuming a fixed demand. We begin with
the standard following preliminary definitions, which we owe to early studies of Wardrop [41] and Beckman,
McGuire and Winsten [4].
Definition 2.1 (Preliminaries). A road network is a directed graph G = (V, E), where the vertices represent
intersections and edges represent sections. A demand over the network is a rate of drivers di, associated
with all origin-destination pairs si − ti of vertices, termed commodities, indexed by the set I. To each
commodity, we associate Pi the set of simple paths from origin to destination, and group them in the set of
paths P =
⋃
i∈I Pi. A flow compatible with such demand is a nonnegative vector f indexed on P such that
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for all commodity i ∈ I, ∑
p∈Pi
fp = di.
We denote the set of possible flows as ∆(P) and note that it is a finite-dimensional nonempty convex set.
When there is a single commodity with unit demand, ∆(P) is the simplex over P. A flow f on paths will










This is mostly to make the difference when needed between the flows on edges and flows on paths. Informally,
when the distinction is not necessary, they will both be denoted by the same letter, even though ι is not
bijective.
Finally, to each edge e ∈ E is associated a nonnegative continuous nondecreasing function ce of the flow
fe, which represents the cost (or latency or travel time) seen by the drivers. When we evoke cost functions
or costs per edge, we refer to the ce, while c is a set of cost functions indexed by the edges E . Likewise, the










but it will only be used parsimoniously, when the context will not be sufficient.
Having defined all notations, we can complete the definition of a road network as the triple N = (G, d, c),
the set of commodities being implicitly indexing d.
Remark 2.2. This definition does not include a priori the time spent at intersections, nor the difference
between left and right turn. As a first approximation to account for these in the modeling framework above,
one could add sections representing turns, from one road to another. Note, however, that in this case the
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cost of such sections would not depend on flows of other sections, which lacks realism.
Now that we have laid useful notations, we can wonder which flows are actually played out by drivers.
To answer this, we firsk ask,
Question 2.3. Assuming a given flow f , how would a single driver driving from si to ti decide on his own
flow assignment?
If we assume the utility of a driver is the opposite of his travel time, our driver seeks to solve,
minp∈Pi cp(f).
The problem looks combinatorial at first sight, but it can be solved economically by a Dijkstra algorithm on
a path planner, or by intuition and habit. For any path p ∈ Pi with positive flow fp > 0, there is a driver




This leads to the natural definition of a Wardrop equilibrium, essentially a Nash equilibrium on a road
network with nonatomic drivers.
Definition 2.4 (Wardrop equilibrium [41]). A flow f on a network N = (G, d, c), is a Wardrop equilibrium
if for all i ∈ I and p ∈ Pi,
fp > 0 =⇒ min
p′∈Pi
cp′(f) = cp(f).
In the following, we will denote Wardrop equilibria as f◦, with a parameter when we will deal with multiple
networks.
Remark 2.5. The definition can be alternatively read as ‘for all commodities, all taken paths must have
the same, lowest, travel time’. Indeed if p, p′ ∈ Pi are two paths of the same commodity, and if further they
are both taken f◦p , f
◦







they share the same lowest travel time.
Wardrop equilibria describe routing when all drivers route individually optimally and, in turn, is some-
times referred to as ‘selfish routing’ (even though it really describes a situation where lack of coordination,
rather than bona fide self-centeredness, prevails).
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Now that we have an approximation of the routing of all players, we need to characterize how efficient it
is. To do so, we use the total time spent on the road as a measure of the social cost induced by a routing.
Definition 2.6 (Social cost). Given a network N = (G, d, c), we define the social cost of a routing f (a








Again, Ψ will have a parameter when we will work with multiple networks.
Remark 2.7. The social cost is a measure which in essence only captures travel times. It does not pertain
to the cost of building and maintenance of a network, but is rather a measure of ‘total inconvenience’, which
is a convenient tool thanks to its close relation with the potential, later defined.
We can benchmark any routing f by comparing it with an optimal routing (any flow minimizing the
social cost and satisfying the demand). An optimal routing is how an oracle would route drivers to minimize
social cost. Formally,





and the optimal value is called optimal social cost.
Remark 2.9. Note that, even though Ψ may not be convex, it is guaranteed to be whenever costs are
standard ([34]). A cost ce is said to be standard if fe 7→ fece(fe) is convex, most of costs of interest are
standard.
The network and costs above naturally define a so-called routing game in which drivers are players, paths
are their action sets (one Pi for each commodity) with their respective costs. This game is a congestion
game, so we should expect it to be a potential game. It is indeed the case, we owe this discovery to Beckman,
McGuire and Winsten [4]. The proof presented in appendix, see section A.1, shows first that the potential,
Φ is convex, which is a result we keep in mind given its importance, and then shows Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
conditions coincide exactly with the definition of a Wardrop equilibrium. We point out here that Φ is
continuously differentiable, with ∇Φ(f) = c(f).









Corollary 2.10.1 (of theorem 2.10, [38]). f ∈ ∆(P) is a Wardrop equilibrium of a network N = (G, d, c),






Proof. f ∈ ∆(P) is a global minimum of Φ convex continuously differentiable on ∆(P), if and only if, for
all g ∈ ∆(P),
dΦ(f)(f − g) = ∇Φ(f)>(f − g) =
∑
p∈P
cp(f)(fp − gp) =
∑
e∈E
ce(fe)(fe − ge) ≤ 0.
Theorem 2.10 fixes the best response of the whole mass of drivers, as if it were a single player with action
set ∆(P) and utility −Φ. This holds as long as the whole population is homogeneous and noncooperative.
In general, we should expect as many ‘players’ as there are ‘types’ of drivers. In our static setting, where the
travel times are deterministically dependent on their flow, all drivers possess the same information, which
explains why there is only one ‘type’.
Theorem 2.11 ([4]). Given a network N = (G, d, c), there exists a Wardrop equilibrium, and moreover all
Wardrop equilibria share the same social cost, namely they are essentially unique.
Proof. The beauty of the existence argument resides in the previous theorem which turned a fixed point
problem into an optimization one. By Weierstrass’ extreme value theorem, there must exist a global minimum
of Φ continuous on the compact set ∆(P). This global minimum is a Wardrop equilibrium by theorem 2.10.
The rest of the proof is given in appendix, section A.1, and shows three interesting facts. Let f and g
be Wardrop equilibria, then
• the costs per edge are identical, ce(fe) = ce(ge) for all e ∈ E , thus c(f) = c(g),
• by convexity of Φ, we find out that c(f)>f = c(f)>g and c(g)>g = c(g)>f ,
• we can rewrite Ψ(f) = c(f)>f , therefore Ψ(f) = Ψ(g).
2.1.2 Best-response dynamics
Wardrop equilibria bring an interesting closure to the prediction of routing: they exist and are essentially
unique, therefore, their study is sufficient to determine routing and its social cost. In turn, instead of consid-
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ering best-response dynamics, one can focus on Nash equilibria, without studying which one is reached, since
they all induce the same social cost. We can further motivate this. Altman and coauthors [2] have shown,
and we will make this statement more precise, that when players asynchronously update their strategies by
best-responding to each other, their strategies converge a Wardrop equilibrium, when the network has affine
costs and drivers are atomic. Their setting is actually more general since it covers players which each route
their own traffic through a network, but it can be adapted to road networks by allocating the same traffic
to all players—one vehicle—and restraining their actions to ‘pure strategies’.
The authors first define a process by which drivers could update their strategy asynchronously.
Definition 2.12 (Asynchronous Best-Response Update, [2]). An ABRU algorithm is an update rule, for
which at all time steps, exactly one driver changes his strategy to play a best-response (against the others),
and which continues until all drivers are content.
Then by an argument brought by Shapley and Monderer [30], they show the following theorem.
Theorem 2.13 ([2]). Any ABRU algorithm eventually stops, reaching a Wardrop equilibrium.
The proof follows from decreasingness of Φ (its discrete version) and exhaustion of the finitely many
possible strategies.
Further, they study the replicator dynamics of the game and prove Wardrop equilibria are stationary
points, to which almost all initial condition converge. We wish here to provide an analogous result, with
more general cost functions and a continuous population of drivers. We refer the reader to a recent and
general work, [39], available in the game theory literature on best-response dynamics of potential games,
although we only focus on a very particular problem here.
If a flow f is played, the tendency for a driver to switch from path p to path p′ could be proportional
to the cost difference, provided it is negative. To shorten notations, we say for two paths p, p′ ∈ P of same
commodity, that path p is shorter than path p′, and we note p <f p
′, if cp(f) < cp′(f). Likewise, longer
will be denoted by >f , and we will also use equality and non-strict inequalities. Moreover, we define the







Basically, a summation is done over paths of same commodity verifying the inequality.




that is, the gain provided by the switch, times the number of drivers on p. Aggregating over all possible







namely the drivers who leave all p′ >f p for p, minus those who leave p to all p
′ <f p. This brings us to







(cp(f)− cp′(f))fp , ϕp(f). (2.2)
Theorem 2.14. Assuming costs ce are locally Lipschitz continuous, the dynamical system (2.2), with any
initial condition f0 ∈ ∆(P), is well-defined in the sense that there exists a unique solution, defined and
remaining in ∆(P) for all positive times. Furthermore, the social cost of the solution converges to the social
cost of a Wardrop equilibrium, and the solution converges to the set of Wardrop equilibria.
The proof, presented in appendix (section A.2), mostly consists in verifying ϕ is locally Lipschitz con-
tinuous and that the solution does stay in ∆(P), ensuring the solution is defined for all positive times. We
point out to the reader a similar ‘global existence’ theorem, more restrictive since it would require ϕ to be
continuously differentiable, but more general as it tackles dynamical systems on a compact manifold, see the
‘Global existence theorem’ by Chillingworth, reported by Perko in [32].
In a second time, we show that the potential Φ is a Lyapunov function leading the solution to inevitably
converge to a Wardrop equilibrium. This further strengthens the predictive power of Φ. Not only are the
minima of Φ the Wardrop equilibria, but it turns out a reasonable dynamical system modeling how drivers
best-respond to their surrounding, is also inexorably driven towards decreasing Φ.
2.2 The inefficiency of selfish routing
This section reviews two facets of the inefficiency of selfish routing. The first one is the price of anarchy,
which captures the inefficiency of the worst instance of selfish routing. The second aspect is Braess’s paradox
which in essence states that closing sections might improve traffic.
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2.2.1 Price of anarchy
If the early work of Beckmann et al. pioneered the study of selfish routing as a congestion game, Rough-
garden’s celebrated price of anarchy, [35], provides an exact quantification of the worst selfish routing. We
completely develop the proofs here, first to acknowledge their cleverness, but also because it will be a great
source of inspiration for the last chapter.
A routing rule is a multifunction which associate to any network N = (G, d, c), a set of flows in ∆(P).
Selfish routing and optimal routing are examples of routing rules, and we will see later more general routing
when networks will be inherently uncertain. Given a network N = (G, d, c) and a routing rule represented
by ,̂ we define the following informal notation,
V̂ (N) , Ψ(f̂),
and in particular, for now,
V ◦(N) = Ψ(f◦), V ∗(N) = Ψ(f∗),
where f◦ is a selfish routing of N and f∗ is an optimal routing of N , although it leaves no ambiguity on
V ◦(N) and V ∗(N).
As we mentioned earlier, we can measure the inefficiency of a routing by comparing its induced social
cost with the optimal social cost. It seems reasonable to ask the inefficiency to remain invariant by scaling
all travel times, as this would simply amount to a change of units (seconds to minutes for example). This
leads us to compare the ratio of social costs, which we term inefficiency,








with the convention that the inefficiency is 1 in the degenerate case where V ∗ = 0. An inefficiency of 1
reflects an optimal routing.
Overall, we will find that the inefficiency of selfish routing remains bounded when we consider concave
costs for example, or polynomial costs of fixed order. The maximal inefficiency of a family of costs, under self-
ish routing, is referred to the price of anarchy. We owe its first definition to Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
[22], motivated to measure the inefficiency of competition over cooperation.
Definition 2.16 (Family of costs). A closed convex set of nonnegative continuous nondecreasing functions












Figure 2.1: Pigou’s network NP and its costs [33]
Originally, in [35], a family of costs were not required to be closed convex, but as we will later take cost
expectations, we henceforth assume families are closed under convexification. Note also that if N = (G, d, c)
is a network with constant costs, then Φ and Ψ are equal, the set of optimal routings is exactly the set of
Wardrop equilibria, its inefficiency is 1.
Definition 2.17 (Price of anarchy, [22]). We let N (C) denotes the set of networks with cost functions in C,
namely networks (G, d, c) such that,
∀e ∈ E , ce ∈ C.
For a family of costs C, the price of anarchy refers to the highest inefficiency (possibly infinite) of a network




1 if V ∗(N) = 0
V ◦(N)
V ∗(N) otherwise.
Example 2.18 (Pigou’s network). Measuring how poor selfish routing can get is a rather old question.
Pigou in [33] had already sketched the idea of a Wardrop equilibrium, by considering parallel roads of
different quality, and explained how such network would lose social value with selfish drivers. In figure 2.1,
we represent the simple single-commidity unit-demand two-route network, NP , as he introduced, with costs,
c1(f1) = 1 and c2(f2) = f2,
to put figures on his idea. As the second path is always faster than the first path, drivers will favor it.
However, this means every driver experiences a travel time of 1, while if some were to take path 1, these
would still experience a travel time of 1, whereas the others would see their travel time reduce. The Wardrop
equilibrium is f◦ = (0, 1), as we said, yielding the social cost V ◦(NP ) = Ψ(f
◦) = 1. On the other hand,
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since,
Ψ(f) = f1 + f
2
2 = 1− f2 + f22 ,
the optimal flow is, f∗ = ( 12 ,
1
2 ), diverting half of the traffic on the otherwise empty road, of social cost
V ∗(NP ) = Ψ(f







If we were considering the network N with cost function c2(f2) = f
n
2 instead, for some integer n ≥ 2,
neither the selfish routing nor the social cost, V ◦(N) = 1, would change, but as,
Ψ(f) = f1 + f
n+1
2 = 1− f2 + f
n+1
2 ,




















Therefore, if costs can be polynomials of any degree, the price of anarchy is infinite. In reality, cost functions
are restricted to certain models. The most common for our toy examples is to use affine costs, although
we will see any concave cost function will yield the same celebrated price of anarchy of 43 , [11]. Common
realistic models include tenth-order polynomials, [37], which yield a price of anarchy about 3.5.
The costs we used are the worst in respectively, the set of affine costs, and the set of n-th order polyno-
mials. However, the price of anarchy is not simply about the worst costs on a given topology (understand
graph), but about the worst case over all networks. If it seems tractable to find the worst case of Pigou’s
network, by maximizing over all costs, it seems arduous to extend it to all networks. Naturally, we are led
to the following question,
Question 2.19. Is the price of anarchy independent on the ‘topology’ of the network?
Roughgarden proved in his celebrated article [35], that it is indeed the case. What the author calls Pigou
bound, namely the worst-case inefficiency over a Pigou network, is equal to the price of anarchy for a large
class cost families. The matter is easier with cost families which contains all constant costs, however we can
work with a much weaker hypothesis as Roughgarden noted.
Definition 2.20 (Inhomogeneous family). A family of costs C is said to be inhomogeneous if it contains a






Figure 2.2: Pigou’s network with cost c and demand d [11, 35]
Definition 2.21 (Pigou bound, [11, 35]). Given an inhomogeneous family of costs C, we define its Pigou
bound as the worst selfish inefficiency of a Pigou network with a demand d ≥ 0, and cost c ∈ C on one path
and c(d) on the other—which might not belong to C—as presented in figure 2.2. A Wardrop equilibrium is
clearly f◦ = (0, d), of social cost dc(d), while the optimal social cost is given by,
min
x∈[0,d]
(d− x)c(d) + xc(x).
Note however that we do not need to restrain x ≤ d, since for x ≥ d,
(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)− dc(d) = x(c(x)− c(d)) ≥ 0.






(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
.
Remark 2.22 ([35]). This definition only makes sense at first with families containing all constants: other-
wise it seems dubious to use the constant cost c(d), it might not belong to C. By definition, for cost families
which contain all constants,
ρ(C) ≥ α(C),
but we will see this holds more generally for inhomogeneous families. Broadly speaking, if c◦ denotes a
cost such that c◦(0) > 0, for all d ≥ 0 a demand and c ∈ C a cost, we can ‘replicate’ the Pigou network
of demand d and cost c. First scale up the costs by adding multiple times the same road in series, so that
mc◦(0) ≈ nc(d), and then duplicate the first path in parallel so that traffic gets diluted to the point the cost
is almost constant. We prove this formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.23 ([35]). If C is an inhomogeneous family of costs, then,
ρ(C) ≥ α(C).
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We develop the proof as it will make us realize how one can recreate the constant cost c(d), only using
a cost c◦ such that c◦(0) > 0. Roughgarden [35] noted that it should be possible to replace any constant
cost by a proper addition of costs c◦(0). This is correct in deterministic networks, but it might fail when
we will start considering nondeterministic networks. Most notably, proposition 4.6 requires 0 to be a cost of
the given family, and it is still for us a conjecture whether this hypothesis can be relaxed. In addition, we
ask families to contain a cost c∗ such that c∗(0) = 0 for most of the other results.











Figure 2.3: Augmented Pigou network, here n = 4, p = 4 and q = 2 [34]
Proof. First let c ∈ C and d ≥ 0. We denote by c◦ a cost of C such that c◦(0) > 0. We assume d > 0
otherwise there is no routing, and c(d) > 0, otherwise c = 0 ∈ C then c(d) ∈ C, the Pigou network of cost c
and demand d is already with costs in C. Let (pn, qn)n∈N be a sequence of positive integers such that,











For n ∈ N, we define then the network Nn as the graph with one source, one sink, of demand d, with n+ 1
paths: among them the bottom path is constituted of qn roads in series each of cost c, and the n other paths
are constituted of pn roads in series each of cost c
◦. See figure 2.3 for an example, and for reference Pigou’s
network is a special case of augmented Pigou network with n, p, q = 1.
Since, pnc
◦(0) ≥ qnc(d), a Wardrop equilibrium consists in all drivers taking the bottom path of cost
qnc, inducing the social cost,
V ◦(Nn) = qndc(d).
Now, for all x ∈ [0, d], the optimal social cost is less than the routing which sends x drivers on the bottom
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path and the others equally on the top paths,



















(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
.
Therefore, for all c ∈ C and d ≥ x ≥ 0,
ρ(C) ≥ dc(d)




This clever construction dilutes the traffic on roads of cost c◦ by offering many parallel roads, and
adjusts c◦(0) to c(d) by duplicating sections with the proper ratio. Now a key lemma by Roughgarden again,
altogether with the corollary 2.10.1 proposed by Smith [38], will yield gracefully the main theorem 2.25.
Lemma 2.24 ([34]). If C is a family of costs with α(C) <∞, then for all c ∈ C and f, g ≥ 0,
gc(g) ≥ fc(f)
α(C)
+ (g − f)c(f).
This lemma is a simple application of the previous proposition, with a little catch when (f − g)c(f) +
gc(g) = 0, so we only present a proof in the appendix to lighten the text (section A.3).
Theorem 2.25 ([35]). The price of anarchy of an inhomogeneous family of costs C is given exactly by its
Pigou bound,
ρ(C) = α(C).
Proof. Let C be an inhomogeneous family of costs. By proposition 2.23, α(C) ≤ ρ(C), so the result is already
proven if α(C) =∞. Assume henceforth α(C) <∞. Let N = (G, d, c) be a network with costs in C, f◦ be a



























where the first inequality is an application of lemma 2.24, and last inequality is proven by corollary 2.10.1.
























Figure 2.4: Braess’s paradox diamond network with its costs
2.2.2 Braess’s paradox
We start with the following natural question.
Question 2.26. Does adding more capacity to a network decrease the social cost?
While the answer should be an obvious ‘yes’, decreasing the travel-time function of a section, for example,
does not seem to change the Ψ-value (social cost) of the minimum of Φ (Wardrop equilibrium) in a predictable
way. In fact, there are situations where the addition of a road, or its betterment, worsens the situation.
This counterintuitive phenomenon, known as Braess’s paradox, was first imagined by Braess [9]. It has since
been a proposed answer to the various empirical observations.
Example 2.27 (Canonical Braess’s paradox example). Consider the network of figure 2.4, denoted NB(x),
with travel times of each sections,
ce1(fe1) = fe1 , ce2 = 1, ce3 = x, ce4 = 1, ce5(fe5) = fe5 ,
where x ≥ 0 is a constant. The network becomes at first sight better as x decreases since the roads only
shorten. The only commodity considered is the couple of vertices v1 to v3, of unit-demand. We define the
paths: p1 = e1e2, p2 = e1e3e5, p3 = e4e5. The travel time of each path is,
cp1(f) = fe1 + 1 = fp1 + fp2 + 1,
cp2(f) = fe1 + x+ fe5 = fp1 + fp2 + x+ fp2 + fp3 = 1 + x+ fp2 ,
cp3(f) = 1 + fe5 = 1 + fp2 + fp3 .
We notice that if f is a Wardrop equilibrium, then so is f ′ = (fp3 , fp2 , fp1), and by convexity of Φ, so
is 12 (f + f
′). Therefore, we can focus on equilibria for which fp1 = fp3 , namely equilibria of the form
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(y, 1− 2y, y) with y ∈ [0, 12 ]. Costs are then,
cp1(y) = 2− y,
cp2(y) = 2− 2y + x,
cp3(y) = 2− y.
If y ∈ (0, 12 ), then
2− y = 2− 2y + x =⇒ y = x,
if y = 0, then x ≤ 0 and if y = 12 , then
1
2 ≤ x. We conclude that the only Wardrop equilibrium of the form
(y, 1− 2y, y) is with,
y =






thus the social cost of the selfish routing is,
V ◦(NB(x)) = Ψ((y, 1− 2y, y)) =






In other words, the social cost increases when section e3 becomes shorter, due to a less efficient routing. If
e3 were to be closed, the flows would match the optimal flows, which are independent of x. To repeat it,
closing the midway section would take the network from a completely clogged state (inefficiency reaching
the price of anarchy for affine costs), to an optimal state.
This counterintuitive result is a manifestation of Braess’s paradox. Note that the extent of Braess’s
paradox is upper-bounded by the inefficiency of the original network. Indeed, if you take away edges from
a network, the routing cannot be more efficient than the optimal routing on the original network.
Definition 2.28 (Subnetwork). A network N ′ = (G′, d, c′) is said to be subnetwork of a network N =
(G, d, c) if they have the same commodities I and demand d and,
G′ ⊂ G and ∀e ∈ E ′, c′e ≥ ce.
In other words, G′ has the same demand but less, and less efficient roads. We note N ′ ⊂ N .
Braess’s paradox shows that a subnetwork N ′ ⊂ N can have a better social cost, and with the example
we provided, to the worst extent possible allowed by the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.29 ([34]). A subnetwork N ′ ⊂ N can at most divide the social cost V ◦(N) by the inefficiency
of selfish routing on N .
Proof. Let N ′ ⊂ N be two networks. Let f ∈ ∆(P ′) be a flow over N ′, by definition P ′ ⊂ P, so that f can
also be seen as a flow on N , with flow 0 on the paths of P which do not belong to P ′. Then, f induces more













As a result, any routing on N ′ costs socially more than the optimal routing on N , therefore,









is the inefficiency of selfish routing on N .
In parallel to this model, it has been observed that closing some roads would indeed better the traffic
conditions. The prototypical example is the closing of the 42nd Street in Manhattan on Earth day in 1990,
[17]. It was feared that the traffic would be catastrophic on that day, but surprisingly, the network saw a
decrease in congestion. However, the section was only closed for a day, which might not have let enough
time to reach a Wardrop equilibrium, and there might have been less demand due to anticipatedly disastrous
traffic conditions.
In 2003, the removal of a six-lane highway over the Cheonggyecheon river—which had been completed
in 1976, and seen at the time as an improvement in traffic—actually decreased travel times in the city, all
the while the demand remained constant, [3, 16]. The time scale allowed the traffic to settle to a Wardrop
equilibrium and provides a much stronger example of the paradox in real-life conditions. On top of the
traffic betterment, the river is now an open park for pedestrians, providing yet another substantial gain.
Likewise, some studies of London, NYC and Boston’s traffic revealed that those cities’ networks likely
also fall in the regime of Braess’s paradox [44]. It would thus appear that closing carefully chosen sections
could improve the traffic, at virtually no cost. However, finding which subnetwork (with same costs, just
less roads) would route drivers best is a combinatorial problem. One lead one could follow, is to solve the
optimal flow problem, and detect which sections are currently overused, in hope of revealing good candidates
to the paradox, but it turns out the problem is NP-hard in a dramatic way.
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In the context of the following proposition, a subnetwork has the same costs per edge, but some edges
are removed, although each commodity retains a path across.
Theorem 2.30 ([34]). Assuming P 6= NP , for all ε > 0, there is no polynomial algorithm (in the number
of edges) which from a network with affine costs N , returns a subnetwork N ′ ⊂ N such that,









Provision of information under
uncertainty
The traffic models considered in the chapters up until now have assumed that all drivers have access to the
same static information, and thus no external agent could ever disturb a Wardrop equilibrium by providing
information. However, roads are typically prone to random events which may change their cost function.
Taking this into account not only allows for more realistic modeling but also offers the opportunity to treat
information provision as another control mechanism.
We could expect the drivers to perform better knowing which roads are closed or jammed, but providing
the same public information might only reroute drivers on other roads. On the other hand, if no information
were provided, we might expect drivers to perform arbitrarily bad compared to a ‘fully informed’ situation.
Some studies in the transportation literature have aimed to study the subtle role of information provision
in routing, notably the work of Ben-Akiva and coauthors and Mahmassani et al., [25, 5, 6], and demonstrated
its counterintuitiveness. More recently, Acemoglu et al. [1] raised an ‘informational Braess’s paradox’. A
population aware of a greater part of the network than another, suffers a greater cost per driver than their
uninformed counterparts.
3.1 The need for signaling
At this point, we have seen how one can take measures to reduce congestion by acting on the network itself.











Figure 3.1: The unawareness catastrophe network [26]
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to accidents, jams and all sorts of vagaries.
Example 3.1 (The unawareness catastrophe, [26]). Consider the simple network of figure 3.1. The first road
is usually fast but prone to traffic jams, which is an intrinsic state of the section, not directly depending on
the incoming flow. To do so, we denote by ω = 0 the normal situation, and by ω = 1 the jammed situation.
The costs are set to be,
c1(f1, ω) = λω and c2(f2) = f2,
where λ is a constant greater than 1. Naturally, the optimal flow for each situation follows f∗2 (ω) = ω. When
ω = 0, an oracle would better route all drivers on edge 1, while when ω = 1, c1 > 1 ≥ c2 no matter the
flows, so the best routing is all drivers on the second road. Notice that if the drivers were informed, they
would also follow this routing selfishly. If we let µ̄ = P[ω = 1], the social cost of this routing is,
V ∗ = E[Ψ(f∗(ω), ω)] = µ̄.
However, if drivers are not informed, they can only judge according to an expected travel time,
Eµ̄[c1(f1, ω)] = λµ̄ and c2(f2) = f2.
For µ̄ < 1λ , both roads are taken, thus share the same expected cost λµ̄. The social cost is then,
V ◦ = E[Ψ(f◦(µ̄), ω)] = λµ̄,




which may be arbitrarily large. In other words, the price of anarchy is infinite when the network is not
deterministic and drivers remain uninformed.
We notice however that signaling the whole state of the network to all drivers, allowed them to route
optimally. Although this is not always the case, revealing completely the state of the network reinstates the
former deterministic price of anarchy.
Definition 3.2 (Normal family costs). We say that a family of costs C is normal, if there are c◦, c∗ ∈ C such
that,
c◦(0) > 0 and c∗(0) = 0.
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Proposition 3.3. For any normal family of costs C, when drivers are uninformed, the price of anarchy is
infinite, which we denote by,
ρni(C) =∞.
For any family of costs C (not necessarily normal), when drivers are fully informed, the price of anarchy
remains the same,
ρfi(C) = ρ(C).











Figure 3.2: An example of network Nn, here n = 4, p = 4, q = 2
Proof. We have to extend our example for any normal family C. The key cost here is c1(f1, ω) = λω, while
c2(f2) = f2 is rather banal. In fact we will use c
◦ as a cost for the bottom path. With adequate ratios we
can bring c◦(0)µ̄ to a match with c◦(1), like we had λµ̄ < 1 = c2(1), and finally we can dilute the traffic on
the top path by duplicating it in parallel.
Let then C be a normal family. Let Ω = {0, 1} and µ̄ = P[ω = 1] > 0 be fixed for now. Let c◦, c∗ ∈ C be
such that,
c◦(0) > 0 and c∗(0) = 0,
and define,
c̃(f, ω) = ωc◦(f) + (1− ω)c∗(f),
which is a cost in the stochastic closure of C (understand convex closure, see section B.1 for a detailed
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and consider the network Nn as depicted on figure 3.2. It has a source and a sink, linked by n + 1 paths,
and a unit demand. The bottom path has qn roads in series each of cost c
◦. The n upper paths have each
pn roads in series, each of cost c̃. Note that ω is common to all upper sections.
Since,
Eµ̄[pnc̃(0, ω)] = pnµ̄c◦(0) ≤ qnc◦(1),
the upper paths are taken by some uninformed drivers, so that in expectation the social cost is at least the
demand times the expected cost of the empty upper paths,
V ni(Nn) ≥ Eµ̄[pnc̃(0, ω)] = pnµ̄c◦(0).
Further, if we let the traffic on the bottom path be equal to ω, we see that,






















This bound is valid for all µ̄ > 0, therefore,
ρni(C) =∞.
Now, for any networkN , for each ω ∈ Ω, if drivers are fully informed, they will play a Wardrop equilibrium
with costs cp(·, ω). The selfish routing depends on ω, we denote it f◦(ω) and we have by definition of the
deterministic price of anarchy,
Ψ(f◦(ω), ω) ≤ ρ(C)Ψ(f∗(ω), ω),
thus in expectation,
V fi(N) = Eµ̄[Ψ(f◦(ω), ω)] ≤ ρ(C)Eµ̄[Ψ(f∗(ω), ω)] = ρ(C)V ∗(N),
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so clearly, ρfi(C) ≤ ρ(C). To conclude, the controller has no leverage to nudge drivers on a deterministic
network, therefore ρfi(C) ≥ ρ(C).
We note however that if drivers do not have full knowledge of the network, a controller could provide
information about roads and paths some drivers might not be aware of. In [1], the authors explore what they
term ‘informational Braess’s paradox’, providing a characterization of networks for which groups of drivers
which know less than others, can perform better than others.
A bit later, we will specify the definition of Wardrop equilibria in the informational context and provide
various ways for a controller to signal drivers. The question that will preoccupy us in the rest of the chapter
is,
Question 3.4. How to signal drivers optimally?
Before going further, we would have to clarify how we define stochastic costs. Informally, we had simply
said that now costs depend on another variable, the state of the world. In proposition 3.3, for the no-
information case, we do not really have to worry because we exhibited a special case where Ω is finite. In
this case, it is clear that the expectation of costs in C is a cost in C, by convexity of C. However, when Ω
is uncountable, we need to exert more care and this is properly done in the appendix, section B.1. For the
rest, one can just go forward with the following points in mind,
• cost families are convex, an essential property when dealing with expected costs,
• a stochastic cost of a cost family C is essentially a (Bochner) measurable and integrable function from
Ω to C,
• the stochastic closure of C with prior µ̄, noted C∗(µ̄), is the set of stochastic costs of C,
• one can take the expectation of a stochastic cost c ∈ C∗(µ̄), for any µ µ̄, Eµ[c] ∈ C.
3.2 Signaling publicly
We find the controller has two canonical means to provide information. The first one is a publicly available
information for drivers, which we recently presented in details in [27] (an extended version containing the
proofs is available at [28]). We owe this idea to the article by Das, Kamenica and Mirka [12], who also present
private signaling. The principal machinery behind this is the celebrated Bayesian persuasion, introduced by
Kamenica and Gentzkow [20]. Broadly speaking, all drivers having the same information means that they
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Figure 3.3: A public signal example network [26]
3.2.1 Introductory example
The first means of communication we consider are public, practically: road-side electronic billboards, radio
broadcasts or any signal that can be received by all drivers and sent by a unique controller. As earlier, Ω
encompasses all possible states of the road network, for example Ω = [0, 1] could accurately describe the
congestion level of one road.
In this example, which we take back from [28, 26], we set Ω = {0, 1} as earlier, and the network is the
simple two-route network of figure 3.3, with unit demand and travel times,







with the convenient slight abuse of notation f = f2.
The effective state of the road is the realization ω ∼ µ̄ ∈ ∆(Ω), observed uniquely by the controller,
willing to minimize social cost and controlling the information displayed to the drivers. Note here that ∆(Ω)
denotes the space of probabilities over Ω (and its Borel σ-algebra). In our example, since Ω = {0, 1}, we can
identify ∆(Ω) with [0, 1], with the convention µ̄ = P[ω = 1].
As we saw in the previous section, the controller could decide to disclose nothing, or disclose totally the
state of the network sending m = ω. But on top of that, the controller could pick a message stochastically
with ω. Informally, if drivers know accurately that one road is jammed, they might reroute towards other
roads, while routing some drivers on the jammed section could benefit drivers as a whole. So, it might be
better overall to sometimes signal a perturbation, say with message 1, while ω = 0, so that the beliefs of the
drivers that ω = 1, after receiving m = 1, is lower than 1.
We specify with the following definition how the controller is able to disclose her information.
Definition 3.5 (Public policy). Given a probability space (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄) and a finite message space M , a
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Nature Controller Drivers
ω ∼ µ̄ m ∼ σω f◦(µm)
Figure 3.4: Public signaling flowchart
public policy, or public signaling scheme, is a stochastic measurable function of Ω to M , with the notation,
σ = (σω)ω∈Ω ∈ ∆(M)Ω,
∆(M) denoting the simplex over M finite.
In accordance with Bayesian persuasion [20], the controller has the power to commit to a particular
public policy. Indeed, practically drivers do not explicitly carry out a Bayesian computation to obtain
their posteriors, rather they learn an equilibrium by playing better (individual) responses over time. This
means the observed correlation between ω and m is what shapes the actions of the drivers, thus it is in the
controller’s best interest to commit to a given public policy.
The drivers, having observed the message, will route according to a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium, in
essence a Wardrop equilibrium with expected travel times. We make this more precise with a definition.
Definition 3.6 (Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium). A flow f on a stochastic network (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) is
termed Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium, for a population with homogeneous belief µ µ̄, if it is a Wardrop
equilibrium on the network with expected costs cp(·, µ) , Eµ[cp(·, ω)]. We denote a Bayesian Wardrop
equilibrium with belief µ as f◦(µ). Likewise, we define the expected social cost Ψ(·, µ) , Eµ[Ψ(·, ω)]. We
refer to proposition B.3 for a proper definition of expected costs.
Note that the whole original discussion on existence and essential uniqueness of Wardrop equilibria
remains valid. That is why we can simply write f◦(µ) for a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium. We will make
this statement more rigorous in the next section.
Pictorially, figure 3.4 summarizes the situation. The controller sees ω, then sends m to all drivers at once,
according to a forechosen public policy, drivers all receiving m play out a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium
with common posterior µm. These beliefs are the product of a Bayesian update: after receiving message m,
drivers update their prior µ̄ over ω to the posterior µm, according to Bayes rule,
µm = P[ω = 1 |m] =




ω∈Ω P[m ∩ ω]P[ω]
=
σ1(m)µ̄
σ0(m)(1− µ̄) + σ1(m)µ̄
.
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With belief µ, the difference in cost between the first and second path is,







(f(3− 2µ)− (2µ− 1)) ≥ 0,
if and only if,
f ≤ 2µ− 1
3− 2µ
,








Given how drivers route, we can write the social cost as,
V ◦ = Eµ̄[Eσω [Ψ(f◦(µm), ω)]],
however we see µm appear in f
◦, while we would rather have only σ. The expression which gives µm as a
function of σ is rather cumbersome. It is much more convenient to work directly with the posteriors µm,
and their distribution τ (τ(m) , P[m]). The social cost can then be elegantly rewritten,
V ◦ = Eτ [Eµm [Ψ(f◦(µm), ω)]] = Eτ [v̂(µm)],
once we define the conditional social cost,
v̂(µ) , Ψ(f◦(µ), µ) = Eµ[Ψ(f◦(µ), ω)].
Literally, it is the social cost conditioned on the posterior µ. It can also be seen as the social cost of
uninformed drivers, with prior µ. Here we compute,
v̂(µ) = (1− f◦(µ))(1− µ) + 2µ =

1 + 13−2µ if µ ≥
1
2
1 + µ otherwise.
The very last step is to understand which distributions of posteriors τ, (µm)m∈M the controller can
generate using a public policy σ. If we achieve it, we may find an optimal distribution of posteriors, then
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P[m]P[ω = 1 |m] = P[ω = 1] = µ̄.
This condition is termed Bayes plausibility and we will see later that this is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the distribution of posteriors τ, (µm)m∈M to be induced by some public policy. In essence, it
states that the average posterior is the prior. We can focus on posteriors such that µ̄ is within their convex
combination, Bayes plausibility will yield a ‘unique’ τ .
If we recall, the objective of the controller’s program, the social cost, was written in a similar fashion,
Eτ [v̂(µm)].
Now, if instead of posteriors, we consider points on the graph of v̂, i.e. points (µ, v̂(µ)) with µ ∈ ∆(Ω), the
program becomes the minimization of the ordinate of a convex combination, Eτ [v̂(µm)], while its abscissa,
Eτ [µm], must equal the prior.
In our example, the controller chooses two points on the graph of v̂, one on the left and one on the right
of µ̄. However, it can be more fruitful to think for all µ̄ at once, as Kamenica and Gentzkow explain [20].
If we do so, it is easier to see that the set of couples of prior and social costs induced by a public policy, is
the convex hull of the graph of v̂. Then, the lowest social cost for each prior is given by the minimum of the




1 + 89µ if µ ≤
3
4
1 + 13−2µ otherwise.
See figure 3.5 for a visualization. The lower convex hull of v̂ at µ, Vex(v̂)(µ), is generated by the beliefs
µ0 = 0 and µ1 =
3
4 for µ ∈ [0,
3
4 ], and by the belief µ for µ ∈ [
3
4 , 1]. Therefore, if the prior is less than
3
4 ,
an optimal policy induces the beliefs µ0 and µ1, much as we had informally predicted, otherwise an optimal
policy is to not reveal any information, as the posteriors equal the prior.
3.2.2 Bayesian Persuasion applied to road traffic
Bayesian persuasion, recently introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow [20] and already celebrated, is the
presentation of a general class of games. In such games, a Sender (our controller) witnesses the realization of












Figure 3.5: Graph of v̂ and Vex v̂
Receiver, seeing message m, has a belief µm and acts accordingly with action â(µm) (the most beneficial to
the Sender if there are multiple best responses). The conditional cost incurred by the Sender is then v̂(µm),
the rest of the analysis follows.
To set this machinery in motion, let us first come back formally on the existence and essential uniqueness
of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, or in other words, explicit â and v̂.
Proposition 3.7. Given a stochastic network (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) and a common belief µ µ̄, there exists
a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium, and the conditional social cost is simply the social cost with expected costs,
thus all Bayesian Wardrop equilibria share the same social cost.
Proof. The first point follows directly from the definition of a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium and theorem
2.11, since a convex combination of cost functions is a cost function by proposition B.3. Secondly, for the
controller seeing ω, the social cost is,
Ψ(f◦(µ), ω).




f◦p (µ)Eµ[cp(f◦, ω)] = v̂(µ),
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the social cost with expected costs, which is identical for all Bayesian Wardrop equilibria by theorem 2.11.
Note that µ is common to the drivers estimating the network state, and to the controller aggregating the
social cost by posterior (by message). This holds since the drivers and the controller have the same correct
prior µ̄.
We had introduced the notion of public policy σ, but for the rest we have been focusing on the posterior
beliefs µm. Naturally, the response of the drivers is best formulated with beliefs, but as we saw with the
introductory example, we can also rewrite the social cost easily in terms of the beliefs and their distribution
τ ∈ ∆(M):
V (σ) = Eµ̄[Eσω [Ψ(f◦(µm), ω)]] = Eτ [Eµm [Ψ(f◦(µm), ω)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,v̂(µm)
] = Eτ [v̂(µm)].
Further, although the controller chooses σ ∈ ∆(M)Ω, there is a nice characterization of exactly which
distribution of beliefs correspond to a public policy σ.
Lemma 3.8 (Bayesian plausibility [20]). Given a probability space (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄) and a finite message space
M , the distribution of beliefs, τ, (µm)m∈M , induced by a public policy σ, are exactly those for which,
Eτ [µm] = µ̄, (3.1)
and which are absolutely continuous with respect to the prior, µm  µ̄.
The formal proof is available in appendix, section B.2, we note that one has to exert some caution with
Ω infinite, hence the hypothesis of absolute continuity, µm  µ̄.
Proposition 3.9. Given a stochastic network (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) and finite message space M , and letting
∆µ̄(Ω) denote the space of probabilities over Ω, absolutely continuous with respect to the prior µ̄, the program
of the controller can be rewritten in terms of distribution of posteriors as follows,
min Eτ [v̂(µm)],
τ ∈ ∆(M),
∀m ∈M,µm ∈ ∆µ̄(Ω),
s.t. Eτ [µm] = µ̄
(3.2)
where v̂ is defined by, for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
v̂(µ) = Ψ(f(µ), µ) = Eµ[Ψ(f(µ), ω)].
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The program has a neat geometric interpretation: we want to minimize the ordinate of a convex combi-
nations of points on the graph of v̂, such that its abscissa is µ̄. More formally it leads to,
Theorem 3.10 ([20]). Given a stochastic network (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) and a finite message space M , the
reachable social costs with a public policy are included in,
{z, (µ̄, z) ∈ Conv(v̂)},
where Conv(v̂) is the convex closure of the graph of v̂. If further Ω is finite, the inclusion is an equality
whenever |M | ≥ |Ω|, which justifies to use M = Ω without loss of generality. An optimal distribution of
beliefs can be retrieved by finding the convex combination yielding the minimal value.
This theorem allows to turn the problem into a convex optimization problem when Ω is finite and the
number of messages is unrestricted. However there are multiple hurdles on the way. The computation of v̂
is not trivial: it consists mostly in finding, for each µ ∈ ∆µ̄(Ω), a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium. This can




We note that Eµ[Φ(·, ω)] is a convex function, and the constraint set is convex as well. However, the
dimension of the problem is the number of paths (minus the number of commodities), solving explicitly
the KKT conditions might prove combinatorially hard. One idea could be to sample v̂ by solving convex
programs, and later compute the convex hull of the sample points.
Nonetheless, this allows an explicit solution in our toy examples and if v̂ is convex or concave the solution,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.10.1 ([20]). If v̂ is convex, an optimal policy is to not signal anything (no information policy).
If v̂ is concave, an optimal policy is to signal truthfully, m = ω, (full information policy). If v̂ is affine, all
policies yield the same social cost.
Remark 3.11 (On recommendations). In the original article on Bayesian persuasion [20], Kamenica and
Gentzkow consider the receiver as a single player. In this context, messages can be simplified. At first, M
is arbitrary, messages need only to be distinguishable, they do not rely on an intrinsic meaning. But by
replacing the labels m, by the action the receiver would take, â(µm), the controller makes the messages
legible as a persuasive recommendation.
Although we have multiple players, the insights provided by the work of Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten
[4], allowed us to treat the population as a single player. However, there is a catch. The action set of a
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driver is some finite set Pi, but the action set of the mass is ∆(P), the set of mixed strategies. This does not
impact the program, but prevents the signal from being a recommendation. The labels m could be replaced
by the collective action of the drivers f◦(µm), but that would not be a recommendation since the actions of
each individual driver are discrete and not a flow.
This remark leaves an open end on how to signal a population of drivers, with each their own perception
of messages, which might not be exactly Bayesian, and might ascribe too much intrinsic meaning. In
addition, the ever-increasing share of cars equipped with in-board real-time path planners brings us to
consider personal recommendation to mitigate congestion.
3.3 Signaling drivers individually
The second information system we consider, is the possibility to signal random fractions of drivers, providing
a private information. This has been recently introduced in [12] by Das, Kamenica and Mirka. It is a seducing
framework as it translates directly to a concrete application with on-board real-time path planners. However
not much progress has been made yet and solving such problem stays for now a combinatorially hard problem.
Nonetheless, the framework brings private signaling—the possibility to signal drivers individually—in the
realm of Bayesian persuasion. We reuse the same network as earlier, the same analysis is available in [26].
As a reminder: Ω = {0, 1}, the network is the simple two-route network of figure 3.3, with unit demand and
travel times,







where we had defined for convenience f = f2.
An oracle would like to induce f∗(ω), each minimizing their respective,









the solution is f∗(0) = 16 and f








The controller—who now has the power to deliver a recommendation directly to each driver—would like
to follow this distribution of messages if it is indeed persuasive. This would be, when ω = 0, sending the
recommendation ‘path 1’ for 56 of the drivers, ‘path 2’ for the others drivers, and when ω = 1, sending each
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recommendations to two halves of the population. However, the controller needs to verify that it is indeed
in each driver’s best interest to follow their recommendation, otherwise they have a better strategy to play.
The authors of [12] ponder on the following question.
Question 3.12. Assuming all drivers follow their recommendation, does any driver have an incentive to
deviate?
Suppose a driver received the recommendation to go on the first path, then the expected difference is,










[−3(1− f∗(0))(1− µ̄) + (1− f∗(1))µ̄] ≤ 0,
if and only if,
−35
6





(6µ̄− 5) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ µ̄ ≤ 5
6
.
Likewise, a driver receiving the recommendation to go on the second path sees an expected difference of,










[−3f∗(0)(1− µ̄) + f∗(1)µ̄] ≥ 0,
if and only if,
−31
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(2µ̄− 1) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ µ̄ ≥ 1
2
.
As a result, the controller can use this private signaling whenever µ̄ ∈ [ 12 ,
5
6 ], but it fails to be persuasive
otherwise. The controller does not end her quest here though, and seeks for the best private policy.
Definition 3.13 (Private policy). Given a stochastic network (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)), a private policy is a
measurable function on Ω to the set of admissible flows ∆(P), to be understood as a repartition function
of the recommendations depending on ω. Refer to figure 3.6 for a pictorial description of the actions and
informations available to the players. Further, we require the policy to be persuasive, namely for all signals
sent with positive probability, the recommendation is at least as good as the other options in expectation,












Figure 3.6: Private signaling scheme
Lemma 3.14. Persuasiveness (3.3) can be explicitly rewritten,
∀i ∈ I, ∀p, p′∈ Pi,
∫
ω∈Ω
fp(ω)[cp(f(ω), ω)− cp′(f(ω), ω)] dµ̄(ω) ≤ 0. (3.4)
This lemma answers the question (3.12) asked by Das and coauthors. A simple proof is available in
appendix, section B.3. Persuasiveness can thus be enforced by an additional set of constraints. Formally,
the program of the controller is given by the following.




s.t. ∀i ∈ I, ∀p, p′∈ Pi,
Eµ̄[fp(ω)(cp(f, ω)− cp′(f, ω))] ≤ 0,
(3.5)
where B(B(Ω),∆(P)) is the space of (bounded) measurable functions on Ω with values in ∆(P).
Remark 3.16. If we find out that the optimal flows f∗ are persuasive, then surely it is a solution to the
program. This corresponds simply to relax the persuasive conditions and check whether the solution is
persuasive. The program, stripped from persuasiveness, is exactly the program of an oracle. Indeed, f





In our example, we saw it was the case as long as µ̄ ∈ [ 12 ,
5
6 ], so f
∗ may or may not be persuasive in general.
Remark 3.17. The program for the optimal routing is a convex program if all cost functions ce are standard,
that is all fe 7→ fece(fe) are convex, which is the case for most considered costs, since ∆(P) is also a convex








Eµ̄[f(ω)[c2(f2(ω))− c1(ω)]] ≤ 0
Eµ̄[(1− f(ω))[c2(f2(ω))− c1(ω)]] ≥ 0
Figure 3.7: Example of nonconvex constraint set
convex. If we take again the simple two-route network with costs,
c1(ω) = ω, c2(f) = f
4,
Ω = {0, 1} and prior µ̄ = 0.1, we get a nonconvex set of constraints, as plotted on figure 3.7.
If we cannot get a simple closed form, we can numerically solve the program. We plot on figure 3.8, for
all µ̄ ∈ [0, 1], the competitive ratios of private over optimal cost, and public over optimal cost, and remark
a better performance compared to public signaling, although we cannot seem to prove it in general. We








Private signaling competitive cost
Public signaling competitive cost
Optimal competitive cost = 1




To get a sense of which signaling can help reduce congestion the most, we can compare signaling schemes
pairwise exhibiting the worst-case ratios. We are heavily inspired by the price of anarchy [22, 35, 11],
especially the ingenious final answer brought by Roughgarden (theorem 2.25), as well as the original signaling
framework brought by Das et al. [12]. We follow the steps of a previous work in a more general setting, [26].
This process can only depict a partial picture since in reality drivers may use different information
providers, which most likely provide the shortest path as per their estimates. This issue has been recently
addressed by Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar [43]. They study the Bayesian Wardrop equilibria of drivers following
various traffic information providers. We discuss their results in our discussion in the last chapter, and for
the rest of the chapter, we will come back to comparing signaling methods pairwise.
Definition 4.1 (Competitive ratio). Given two routing rules 1 and 2 and a family of costs C, we define the




1 if V 2(N) = 0
V 1(N)
V 2(N) otherwise.
The price of anarchy is denoted with this notation as ρ◦∗(C), but we stick to ρ(C) as there is no ambiguity.
Our goal here is to establish the table 4.1, valid for all normal families of costs containing 0 as a cost.
With in mind what we already covered, there is actually only few pieces left to complete the table, we divide
them in subsections.
4.1 Garbled private signaling
The revelation principle introduced by Dasgupta et al. and Myerson [13, 31], would seem to indicate that a
private policy can recreate any public policy by telling each player what to play, thus one might expect the
best private policy to outperform the best public policy. Indeed, for any public policy, we could simply feed
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ρcolrow(C) ni fi pub gpriv ∗
ni 1 ρ(C) 1 1 1
fi ∞ 1 1 1 1
pub ∞ ρ(C) 1 1 1
gpriv ∞ ρ(C) ρ(C) 1 1
∗ ∞ ρ(C) ρ(C) ρ(C) 1














Figure 4.1: Garbled private signaling scheme
drivers recommendations following the public flows. However, this statement is slightly inaccurate. So far,
the flows were a function of ω solely, while the public flows are a function of m.
A second thought on the question leads to augment the definition of private signaling. We can make
private signaling more general by placing any choice of public policy between nature and the controller, as
represented on figure 4.1, we call this signaling scheme garbled private signaling. We also allow the controller
to remove the garbling mechanism, namely private signaling is included in garbled private signaling, but for
now we impose the garbling, with a given finite message space M .
Lemma 4.2. In the context of garbled private policies, the action of the controller is τ, (µm)m∈M , a garbling,
and f ∈ ∆(P)M a private signaling. Persuasiveness can be rewritten,
∀i ∈ I, ∀p, p′∈ Pi, Eτ [Eµm [fp(m)[cp(f(m), ω)− cp′(f(m), ω)]]] ≤ 0, (4.1)
or shorter, as we adopted the convention cp(·, µ) = Eµ[c(·, ω)],
∀i ∈ I, ∀p, p′∈ Pi, Eτ [fp(m)[cp(f(m), µm)− cp′(f(m), µm)]] ≤ 0. (4.2)
Furthermore, the Bayesian plausibility constraint on the distribution of the posteriors remains the same,
Eτ [µm] = µ̄,
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and all posteriors are absolutely continuous with respect to the prior, for all m ∈M, µm  µ̄.
The proof is essentially an application of lemmas 3.14, and 3.8 for the second part. We can then formulate
the garbled private program.
Proposition 4.3. Given a stochastic network (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)), the garbled private program with mes-
sage space M , can be written,
min Eτ [Eµm [Ψ(f(m), ω)]
f ∈ ∆(P)M , τ ∈ ∆(M),
∀m ∈M, µm ∈ ∆µ̄(Ω),
s.t. ∀i ∈ I, ∀p, p′∈ Pi,
Eτ [fp(m)[cp(f(m), µm)− cp′(f(m), µm)]] ≤ 0,
Eτ [µm] = µ̄.
(4.3)
Now, by a revelation principle argument, it is clear that the garbled private signaling is better than
public signaling, we verify it in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Let (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) be a stochastic network and M a finite message space. Let
τ, (µm)m∈M be a Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors, and f
◦(µ) denote the Bayesian Wardrop equilib-
rium with common belief µ  µ̄. Then the garbled private policy τ, (µm)m∈M , (f◦(µm))m∈M is persuasive,
and induces the same social cost as the public policy τ, (µm)m∈M . Therefore, for all stochastic networks N ,
understood the choice of finite message space is left to the controller,
V gpriv(N) ≤ V pub(N),
namely,
ρgprivpub (C) = 1.
Proof. We verify that, for all i ∈ I and p, p′ ∈ Pi, for all m ∈M , either f◦p (m) = 0, in which case,
f◦p (m)[cp(f(m), µm)− cp′(f(m), µm)] = 0,
or, f◦p (m) > 0, then since it is a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium, the path p is in expectation better than p
′
(and all other paths),
f◦p (m)[cp(f(m), µm)− cp′(f(m), µm)] ≤ 0.
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As a result,
Eτ [f◦p (m)[cp(f(m), µm)− cp′(f(m), µm)]] ≤ 0,
the public flows are persuasive. The social costs are identical since for all message m, the flows are the same,
f◦(m).
This does not answer the original question, whether private signaling is always at least as good as public
signaling, but brings a better signaling, at no additional infrastructural cost since garbling is a simple
computation. Furthermore, we do not provide an example of a network for which garbling improves private
signaling. Thus, two questions are now left unanswered:
• Can garbling improve strictly private signaling?
• Can public signaling be strictly better than private signaling?
Now, by the previous proposition, if the first answer were ‘no’, then V priv = V gpriv ≤ V pub, thus the second
would be ‘no’ as well. We note that without garbling, the public flows of all deterministic policies—the
policies for which the message is a deterministic function of the state of the network—are persuasive.
4.2 A worst case of full information
Example 4.5 ([26]). Consider the network of figure 4.2, constituted of 2n parallel roads, with n positive
integer, of unit demand. The state of road i is termed ωi, they are independent identically distributed
according to a Bernoulli law of parameter 12 , we let then Ω = {0, 1}
2n and µ̄ be the discrete uniform













Figure 4.2: The simple 2n-network
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If drivers are uninformed, all roads are equivalent so that fi =
1





















We denote by k the random variable counting the roads in state 1, or in other words, k =
∑2n
i=1 ωi. If drivers
are informed and k ≥ n, then all the roads in state 1 are taken, of common travel time 1k ≤
1
n . If k < n, all
roads taken have the same value 1n , since no longer road would be taken as a driver could just choose a road






















































































































where A is the family of affine costs.
This result is however only interesting for concave costs for which we know the price of anarchy is 43 , we
need to generalize it with the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Let C be a normal family of costs containing 0, then,
ρfini(C) = ρ(C).
Of all the propositions about comparisons of policies, this is the one requiring the most assumptions.
In particular, the table 4.1 is valid for all normal families of costs C such that 0 ∈ C, while everything else
holds without assuming 0 is a cost. We refer the reader to the detailed table 4.2 to have an overview of the
construction of table 4.1 with the corresponding propositions.
Proof. Let c ∈ C be a cost, d a demand, x ∈ [0, d] and n a positive integer. Consider the graph Gn constituted

































Figure 4.4: Cost replacement, with here m = 4, p = 4 and q = 5
demand nx, with the probability space Ωn = {0, 1}n with measure µ̄n, such that the ωi (i ∈ J1, nK) are i.i.d.
with




If C contained all constants, we could define the stochastic costs of C,
ci(fi, ωi) =

c(d) if ωi = 0
c(fi) otherwise
This in turn would define the stochastic network Nn = (Gn, nx, cn, (Ωn,B(Ωn), µ̄n)). For the sake of simplic-
ity, we omit the dependency on n in Ωn, µ̄n, etc. as n is fixed for now. The study of this network eventually
leads to the proof, by showing that,
ρpubgpriv(C) ≥
dc(d)
(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
.
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We can already discard x = 0 or x = d as the ratio is one.
First, we seek to replicate this network using only c ∈ C as fixed earlier, and c◦, 0 ∈ C such that c◦(0) > 0.
To this end, we define,
c◦i (fi, ωi) = (1− ωi)c◦(fi) + ωi × 0
ci(fi, ωi) = (1− ωi)× 0 + ωic(fi).
Then to all edge i of cost ci, we substitue the network presented in figure 4.4. p both the number of
c◦i -sections’ from the middle node to the sink, m denotes the number of parallel ‘c
◦
i -paths’. q denotes the




c◦(0) then we replicate (everything scaled by q) the
behavior of ci. Indeed when ω = 0, the path costs roughly pc
◦(0) ≈ qc(d) per driver. When ω = 1, if f is
the entering flow, the path costs qc(f) per driver.
Hopefully it appears clear how challenging the question would be without the assumption that 0 ∈ C. To
emulate the cost 0, one can, as coined by Roughgarden [34], dilute the traffic on multiple parallel paths of
costs c∗ such that c∗(0) = 0. However, when we need to compose it with another cost c, we cannot simply
do this, because it would also dilute the traffic on c.












If all drivers are uninformed, all roads are equal, the flow on each road is nxn = x, thus the social cost is,














((d− x)c(d) + xc(x)).
Now we denote by kn =
∑n
i=1 ωi, the random variable counting the number of roads in state 1. Assuming







≤ qmc(d) ≤ pmc◦(0),
thus incurring a social cost (conditioned on kn),









If now nxkn > d, there are not enough roads in state 1 to dispatch the traffic on, so all roads are taken with
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the same cost, greater than pmc
◦(0), incurring a social cost,
V fin,kn ≥ nxpmc






















































(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
,
we have to now show that the numerator goes to dc(d) when n goes to infinity. This turns out to be slightly
technical and relies on the central limit theorem and an application of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. The
reader can find the end of the proof in appendix C. After showing the limit is indeed dc(d), the proof
concludes by invoking Roughgarden’s theorem 2.25 and proposition 3.3.
4.3 A worst case of public policy
As we showed, garbled private signaling is always better than public signaling (proposition 4.4). Farther
than that, there is no smaller bound on the inefficiency of public versus garbled private signaling, than the
price of anarchy itself.
Proposition 4.7. Let C be a normal family of costs, then,
ρpubgpriv(C) = ρ(C).
Proof. Let d ≥ x ≥ 0 and c ∈ C. We assume c(d) > c(x), since in the Pigou bound c(d) = c(x) implies
immediately,
dc(d)
(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
= 1 ≤ ρpubgpriv(C),
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Figure 4.5: An example of network Nn, here p = 4, q = 3, r = 2 and n = 4
We will use Ω = {0, 1}, and P[ω = 1] = µ̄ > 0 fixed. Let c◦, c∗ ∈ C be such that,
c◦(0) > 0 and c∗(0) = 0.
We define then the cost,
c̃(f, ω) = ωc◦(f) + (1− ω)c∗(f).























we assume µ̄n →n 0 now but will fix it later, and consider the network Nn of figure 4.5. It has a source, a
sink, linked by n + 1 paths and a demand d. The bottom path is constituted of qn + rn sections in series,
the first qn of cost c, and the last rn of cost c
◦. The top paths are each constituted of pn sections in series,
each of cost c̃. Note, ω is common to all costs.














Let µ be a posterior, common to all drivers. We have then, for n ≥ N ,
pnµc
◦(0) ≤ qnc(d) + rnc◦(d),
therefore a top path must be taken. All paths have the same expected cost, which is at least the expected
cost of a top path with no traffic, the expected social cost knowing µ is then,
v̂(µ) ≥ dpnµc◦(0).
As a result, the social cost of any belief distribution is,
Eτ [v̂(µm)] ≥ Eτ [dpnµc◦(0)] = dpnµ̄nc◦(0),
thus, for n ≥ N ,
V pub(Nn) ≥ dpnµ̄nc◦(0).
Now consider the following private policy: f(0) = 0 and f(1) = x, which are the fractions sent on the
bottom path, the rest of the demand being dispatched equally on the top paths. There are only two signals,

















c(x) + ε− pn
qn
c◦(0)→n c(x) + ε− c(d) < 0,

























while c(0) + εc◦(x)c
◦(0) > 0 (thanks to the ε term). So the second condition is also satisfied for n large
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enough. Therefore, for n large enough,

















































+ µ̄n(d− x)c(d) + µ̄nx[c(x) + ε]
.





















In any case, we find that letting n go to infinity,
ρpubpriv(C) ≥
dc(d)
(d− x)c(d) + x [c(x) + ε]
.
and letting ε vanish,
ρpubpriv(C) ≥
dc(d)
(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
.
Letting c describe C and d, x ≥ 0,
ρpubgpriv(C) ≥ α(C) = ρ(C),
where the last inequality comes from theorem 2.25. Whereas for any network N , since public and garbled
private signaling include full information and by proposition 3.3





To help us with comparisons we note the following fact.
Lemma 4.8. Let a,b ,c be three routing rules, then for any family of costs C,
ρab (C) ≤ ρac (C)ρac (C),
even if some of those quantities are infinite.
Proof. By definition,


















= ρac (C)ρac (C),
where again the ratio is 1 whenever both the numerator and denominator are null.
Now that we have all keys in our hands, we can explain table 4.1 step by step, and note down in table
4.2 the corresponding arguments. The diagonal of the table is trivial, we are comparing each routing rule
to itself. The last column is also obvious, it simply states that the optimal routing is better than any
routing, and that there are cases where they are equivalent (one-route networks for example). The middle
column, over the diagonal, is immediate since full and no information are public policies. The penultimate
column, over the diagonal, comes from proposition 4.4, stating that garbled private signaling contains public
signaling, and the previous statement. The last square over the diagonal comes straight from proposition
4.6 which exhibits a worst case of full-information compared to no-information.
The lower diagonal is more indirect as most comparisons involve two results. The first column can all
be explained by proposition 3.3, which states ρnifi (C) =∞ and by the fact that public signaling contains full
information (by definition) and garbled private signaling contains full information (proposition 4.4). Indeed,
ρnipub(C)ρ
pub
fi (C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≥ ρnipub(C) =∞,
and likewise for garbled private signaling. The rest of the bottom row can be explained by the fact that
















1 optimal routing is optimal,



















1 public signaling contains




ρfini(C) = ρ(C) (proposition 4.6)
provided 0 ∈ C
ρpubgpriv(C) = ρ(C) (proposition 4.7)
ρ(C)
Table 4.2: Competitive ratios and their proofs
deterministic price of anarchy, and further it cannot be more than the price of anarchy since ρfi(C) = ρ(C)
by proposition 3.3 and both public (by definition) and garbled private signaling (by proposition 4.4) contain
full information.
The comparison of public over garbled private signaling is done in 4.7, exhibiting a worst case of public
compared to garbled private signaling. And finally, what is left of the second column can be explained by
ρfini(C) = ρ(C) (proposition 4.6), and again the fact that public and garbled private signaling include full
information.
Finally, we note that all those results hold for normal families of cost, containing 0. It is unclear whether
the result of proposition 4.6 hold if we do not assume anymore that 0 ∈ C. Some of those results hold with
no assumption on C, like proposition 3.3 (for full information) and 4.4, or by definition that public signaling
contains full and no information. Some require simply the family to be inhomogeneous, like proposition 3.3
for no information. In any case, first should be checked that C is indeed a family: closed and convex, then
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whether it is inhomogeneous, otherwise the price of anarchy might even be hard to obtain as it does not fall





Time has come to close our main discussion and to give some afterthought on our hypotheses and deductions.
We assumed throughout a fixed demand. This makes sense in the time scale it takes for drivers to find their
shortest path. However, on the longer run, if we mitigate congestion this might divert public transport users
to the road. This phenomenon is known as the Downs-Thomson paradox, and can be resumed in ‘the travel
time by car is determined by the travel time by public transports’, [15, 29]. This is no particular to the
provision of information: if a network is modified with the intent of benefiting its users, it should take into
account the shift of demand it will incur. This paradox adds to Braess’s paradox [9], increasing the capacity
of a network is not a guarantee of betterment, this seems to vouch for the development of public transports
[29].
In addition, a study could only be complete by including the comfort of pedestrians and public transport
users, as well as the material cost of building and maintaining infrastuctures, into the social cost. Thus, the
social cost we used is only partial, and cannot be used alone to plan a road network in a city. Again, this
pertains to the narrowness of the question of routing, in a much greater social context.
In our study, the controller is alone and wants to make drivers benefit from her information as a whole.
This is quite the opposite of the present situation: many different private path-planners are in competition
to gain popularity. If drivers are rational, they will go for the one providing the shortest paths in average.
Against such planners, able to cater real-time personal information, our controller poses little challenge.
Should she dispose of an informational advantage, though, she would have a leverage compared to the
competitors.
We can discuss the impact of various information provisions on traffic at length, but at the end of the
day, information providers play a greater game. Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar [43] complete an earlier study by
Liu, Amin and Schwartz [24], in which the problem of multiple traffic information systems (TIS) is posed.
Drivers are grouped in populations, each subscribing to a TIS. They show the existence of thresholds in
relative size of populations by comparing them pairwise. In general, the minor population has an advantage
over the major one, but there is a plateau of relative sizes on which their expected cost is the same. The
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authors expose then the existence of stable socially fair equilibria, in which no driver from any population
has an incentive to subscribe to another TIS. This is somehow surprising, an objectively better TIS might
give no advantage as too many drivers might already be subscribed to it.
Given a population subscription distribution, the authors compare the social cost with having all TIS
providing the best route with the social cost having all TIS agreeing on a signaling to reduce congestion,
but not seeing each other’s information. In other words, they compare the inefficiency of the selfish routing
in an asymmetric information environment. They find a similar result to theorem 2.25, [34], namely the
inefficiency is bounded by the Pigou bound, and the bound is tight. However, the inefficiency of stable
socially fair equilibria is not compared, although it is bounded by the price of anarchy by their proposition.
As drivers subscribe to TIS, they also provide them feedback on the state of the network. The information
a TIS disposes of is related to (1) the subscribers using each edge (namely the number of sensors), (2) the
rate of drivers on each edge. For example, a small flow might not reflect the closing of a lane, while it could
be a poor choice to route more drivers there, as above a threshold a jam could form. In [23], we discuss the
implication this would have on the signaling policy of a central controller. The setting is chosen so that,
in terms of public policies, full information is a best choice (v̂ concave) and observe the controller’s best
strategy to reduce congestion, is to send some drivers to probe the stochastic road, even though it is more
costly at first, to obtain a more reliable information. Intuitively, one should expect a similar result with
a TIS trying to minimize the individual cost, thus sending few drivers to probe the network against their
individual incentives.
To add yet another feedback effect, the classical hypothesis that travel times monotonically depend on
the flow of drivers does not stand in highly congested sections. Once a critical density—the number of
drivers per lane per mile—is reached, a jam forms and drivers slow down drastically, the travel times depend
then more on density than incoming flow [18]. Worse, the incoming flow decreases with the density as jam’s
appearance are off-putting, so we observe simultaneously a decrease in flow but an increase in travel time
[21], a situation termed hypercongestion.
This behavior could be modeled through a random state of the road as we did, but its occurrence should
follow some Markov chain, receptive to the incoming flow. There would be more work to be done on this side,
as we simply assumed the state of the road given, independent of the routing. In contrast, the hypotheses
we used are multiple, (1) the network is in a permanent flow state: travel times depend only on flow, (2)
drivers choose their fastest route, (3) the network state is independent of the flow, (4) a single controller
witnesses the state of the roads. Within these simple hypotheses, we were able to characterize the various
inefficiencies between information policies, in the style of the price of anarchy.
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[9] Dietrich Braess. “Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung”. In: Unternehmensforschung 12.1
(1968), pp. 258–268.
[10] Graham Cookson and Bob Pishue. “INRIX Global Traffic Scorecard–Appendices”. In: (2017).
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Appendix A
Proofs of chapter 1
A.1 On Wardrop equilibria
Lemma A.1. Let c be a vector indexed by edges (think costs) and f be a vector indexed by paths (think
flows), then,
c>ι(f) = κ(c)>f.























with f flows on edges so that Φ̃ ◦ ι = Φ. It is easy to prove Φ̃ is convex as for f, g flows on edges,
(∇Φ̃(f)−∇Φ̃(g))>(f − g) = (∇Φ̃(f)−∇Φ̃(g))>(f − g) =
∑
e∈E
(ce(fe)− ce(ge))(fe − ge) ≥ 0,
by nondecreasingness of each ce. Then since ι is linear, Φ = Φ̃◦ ι is convex as well. Note that, ∇Φ̃(f) = c(f),
the vector of costs indexed on edges, with f indexed on edges. Let f, g be indexed on paths, then,
∇Φ(f)>g = ∇Φ̃(ι(f))>ι(g) = κ(∇Φ̃(ι(f)))>g,
thus ∇Φ(f) = c(f), where c(f) and f are indexed on paths.
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The constraint set is convex as we saw and we can explicitly replace f ∈ ∆(P) by,
f ∈ RP , s.t. ∀i ∈ I,
∑
p∈Pi
fp = di, and ∀p ∈ P, fp ≥ 0.
We also know that this set is of nonempty interior, thus, with the convexity of Φ, the program (A.1) satisfies





λi1Pi − µ = 0,
and satisfying the complementary slackness conditions,
∀p ∈ P, µpfp = 0.
This can be rewritten exactly, for all i ∈ I, for all p ∈ Pi,
cp(f) = µp − λi and µpfp = 0.
We verify that if f is a Wardrop equilibrium, then λ, µ defined for all i ∈ I and p ∈ Pi by,
λi = − min
p′∈Pi
cp′(f) and µp = cp(f)− min
p′∈Pi
cp′(f) ≥ 0,
satisfy the conditions. Indeed, for all i ∈ I and p ∈ Pi, either fp > 0, then µp = cp(f)−minp′∈Pi cp′(f) = 0,
or fp = 0, so that in any case µpfp = 0.
Conversely, if f is a minimum of Φ, then there exist such λ, µ. For all i ∈ I and p ∈ Pi, if fp > 0 then
µp = 0, thus for all p
′ ∈ Pi,
cp(f) = −λi ≤ µp′ − λi = cp′(f),
thus it is a Wardrop equilibrium. Note that by convexity of Φ, all local minima are global.
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with f flows on edges so that Φ̃ ◦ ι = Φ. Let f, g be two Wardrop equilibria, they are minima of Φ = Φ̃ ◦ ι
on ∆(P), therefore ι(f) and ι(g) are minima of Φ̃ on the convex set ι(∆(P)). Then, it must be that, along





is affine, since they all are convex. Otherwise, a middle point would have a lower value. As a result, each ce
is constant from fe to ge, thus,
ce(fe) = ce(ge),
so c(f) = c(g) in paths as well.














A.2 On best-response dynamics
The demonstration of theorem 2.14 was left in appendix for two reasons. First, it is calculation-extensive to
manipulate such sums, and might not present as much interest as the result in itself and the spirit guiding
the proof. Second, it stays a little technical, mostly tackling analysis concerns.
Lemma A.2 (Lipschitz on a compact). Let K be a compact metric space and F a metric space. If f : K → F
is locally Lipschitz continuous on K, then f is Lipschitz continuous on K.
Proof. For all x ∈ K, we let Ux be a neighborhood of x (an open subset of K containing x) on which f
is kx-Lipschitz continuous. Since K is compact, covered by the union
⋃
x∈K Ux, there exists a finite union⋃n




By Lebesgue’s number lemma, there exists ε > 0 such that, for all x ∈ K, B(x, ε) (the open ball centered
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on x of radius ε) is contained in one of the Ui. Indeed, otherwise there would be a sequence (xn)n∈N∗ of
K such that B(xn,
1
n ) is never contained in one of the Ui. We could then extract a converging subsequence
(yn)n∈N∗ , to say y ∈ K, such that B(yn, 1n ) is never contained in one of the Ui. But y is contained in say
Ui, open, and d(y, yn) +
1
n →n 0, so that ultimately B(yn,
1
n ) is contained in Ui, which is absurd.
Let x, y ∈ K, if d(x, y) < ε,
d(f(x), f(y)) ≤ kd(x, y),
otherwise, since f is continuous and K compact, f(K) is compact, thus of finite diameter D, then,
d(f(x), f(y)) ≤ D ≤ D
ε
d(x, y).








Lemma A.3 (Global existence dichotomy). Let K be a compact subset of a Banach space E, and f : E → E
be locally Lipschitz. By the Picard-Lindelöf theorem, for x0 ∈ K, we let (I◦, x◦) denote the maximal solution
of the following Cauchy problem,
ẋ = f(x), with x(0) = x0. (A.2)
Then either I◦ contains all positive reals, or there exists t > 0 such that x◦(t) 6∈ K.
Proof. Let (I◦, x◦) be the maximal solution of the Cauchy problem (A.2). Assume that there is no t > 0
such that x◦(t) 6∈ K, yet that sup I◦ = a < ∞. Consider now (an)n∈N a sequence in I◦ converging to a,
then the sequence (x◦(an))n∈N taking values in K, can be extracted to converge to some x ∈ K. We denote
(bn)n∈N the subsequence of (an)n∈N.
Since f is continuous on K compact, we can denote by M a bound on its norm. Then, x◦ is M -Lipschitz
and continuously differentiable on I◦, as it only takes values in K. Let then (cn)n∈N be a sequence in I◦
converging to a, then for all m,n integers,
‖x◦(cn)− x‖ ≤ ‖x◦(cn)− x◦(am)‖+ ‖x◦(am)− x‖
≤M‖cn − am‖+ ‖x◦(am)− x‖ →m M‖cn − a‖,
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therefore, x◦(cn)→n x, in other words, x◦ →a x. Furthermore, the equation,
x′◦ = f(x◦),
shows that x′◦ →a f(x). Therefore, we can extend x◦ by continuity to I◦ t {a}, defining x◦(a) = x, and it is
continuously differentiable on the left of a.
Now we can apply Picard-Lindelöf theorem again, to the initial condition x(a) = x, and obtain another
solution, defined at least on some (a − ε, a + ε), with ε > 0. Then, by uniqueness, these solutions must
coincide on (a−ε, a]. But then, joining the two solutions, we see x◦ is a strict restriction of another solution,
therefore it cannot be maximal, which is absurd.
Proof of theorem 2.14. We identify E = (RP , ‖·‖1) Banach space, and K = ∆(P) compact. First, we extend
ϕ to E by simply setting,
ce(fe) , ce(0), for fe ≤ 0,
costs clearly remain Lipschitz continuous by this addition. We verify that ϕ is locally Lipschitz. Let f ∈ E,
for all f ′ ∈ E, we have,




and for all p ∈ P,















′)− cp′(f ′))f ′p.
Let B be a closed ball centered on f , small enough so that for all f ′ ∈ B, by continuity of each cp, for all
i ∈ I and all p, p′ ∈ Pi,
p >f p
′ ⇐⇒ p >f ′ p′.
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Then, we can rewrite, for f ′ ∈ B,
















′)− cp(f ′))f ′p′ .
Now since the costs ce are locally Lipschitz continuous on the compact B, they are Lipschitz continuous
on B (lemma A.2), say of constant ke. We define the global constant k = maxe∈E ke and see that, for
f, f ′ ∈ ∆(P), and p ∈ P,
|cp(f)− cp(f ′)| ≤
∑
e∈E:e∈p
|ce(fe)− ce(f ′e)| ≤ k
∑
e∈E:e∈p
|fe − f ′e| ≤ k
∑
e∈E






|fp − f ′p| ≤ k|E|‖f − f ′‖.
We define b = maxf ′∈B ‖f ′‖, then for all i ∈ I and paths p, p′ ∈ Pi,
|cp(f)fp′ − cp(f ′)f ′p′ | ≤ |cp(f)fp′ − cp(f ′)fp′ |+ |cp(f ′)fp′ − cp(f ′)f ′p′ | ≤ 2k|E|b‖f − f ′‖.
Therefore, for f ′ ∈ B,
|ϕp(f)− ϕp(f ′)| ≤
∑
p′>fp












2k|E|b‖f − f ′‖+
∑
p′<fp
2k|E|b‖f − f ′‖+
∑
p′=fp
k|E|b‖f − f ′‖
≤ 2k|E||Pi|b‖f − f ′‖,
so finally,






 ‖f − f ′‖,
ϕ is locally Lipschitz continuous on E.
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Let now f0 ∈ ∆(P) be an initial condition, and by Picard-Lindelöf theorem, let (I, f) be the maximal




























(cp′(f)− cp(f))fp′ = 0,
therefore at all times of I, ∑
p∈Pi
fp = di.
Assume that there exists t0 > 0 such that f(t0) 6∈ K. Then there exists p ∈ P such that fp(0) ≥ 0 (by




({0}) = {t ∈ [0, t0], fp(t) = 0},
is nonempty and closed, therefore possesses a maximum t1. Then,
fp(t1) = 0 and ∀t ∈ (t1, t0], fp(t) < 0.







(cp(f(t2))− cp′(f(t2)))fp(t2) < 0,
but since fp(t2) < 0, this term is clearly nonnegative, which is absurd. Therefore, f never leaves K, by
lemma A.3, the solution is defined for all positive times.
Now for the convergence to a Wardrop equilibrium, we invoke a Lyapunov argument. As it turns out,












































(cp(f)− cp′(f))2fp ≤ 0,
with equality if and only if for all fp > 0, there is no p
′ such that p′ <f p, that is if and only if f is at
a Wardrop equilibrium. Suppose f never reaches the set of Wardrop equilibria, then Φ ◦ f is a strictly
decreasing function, bounded by the minimum value of the potential φ0. Therefore, Φ ◦ f converges to some
value φ > φ0.
Define now, ψ = ∇Φ>ϕ, so that Φ(f(t))′ = ∇Φ(f(t))>ϕ(f(t)) = ψ(f(t)). Define the compact set,
D = Φ−1([φ,∞)) = {f ′ ∈ ∆(P),Φ(f ′) ≥ φ}.
The function ψ is continuous on the compact D, thus reaches a maximum in say f◦ ∈ D, of negative value
as f◦ is not a Wardrop equilibrium. As f ∈ D,
Φ(f(t))′ = ∇Φ(f(t))>ϕ(f(t)) ≤ ψ(f◦) < 0,
thus Φ(f(t)) →t −∞, which is absurd, therefore it must be that Φ(f(t)) →t φ0. To finish, note that for
ε > 0 the set Wε constituted of all flows ε-far from a Wardrop equilibrium, is a compact set, therefore Φ
reaches a minimum on it, greater than φ0 by definition of Wε. As a result, for all ε > 0, f ends up being
ε-close from a Wardrop equilibrium, we say that f converges to the set of Wardrop equilibria.
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A.3 A lemma of Roughgarden
Proof of lemma 2.24. Let f, g ≥ 0, and c ∈ C. We know that (f − g)c(f) + gc(g) ≥ 0, as we noted in
definition 2.21. If (f − g)c(f) + gc(g) > 0, by definition of α(C),
α(C) ≥ fc(f)





+ (g − f)c(f).
If (f − g)c(f) + gc(g) = 0, either f > g, then c(f) = 0 and gc(g) = 0, thus trivially,
gc(g) ≥ fc(f)
α(C)
+ (g − f)c(f),
or f = g, which yields again, as α(C) ≥ 1,
gc(g) ≥ fc(f)
α(C)
+ (g − f)c(f),
or f < g, then, since fc(f) + g(c(g)− c(f)) = 0, we have c(g) = c(f) and fc(f) = 0, thus,
gc(g) ≥ fc(f)
α(C)
+ (g − f)c(f).
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Appendix B
On the provision of information
B.1 Technical points on stochastic costs
Here we clarify the definition of stochastic costs. First we note that we can truncate costs so that they live
in the Banach space of continuous functions over a segment. Nonetheless, in the other sections we will still
refer to them as defined over R+, understood that the flow on each edge is anyway bounded by the total
demand.
Definition B.1 (Cost functions). Given a network N = (G, d, c), we let B denote the Banach space of
continuous functions on the segment [0,
∑
i∈I di], with the infinity norm simply written ‖ · ‖. c ∈ B is called
a cost function if it also belongs to the closed convex cone of the nonnegative nondecreasing functions in
B. The definition of B changes with the demand d, but it is to ensure costs are well defined for all possible
flows, yet belong to a Banach space.
A family of costs, as stated in definition 2.16, is a closed convex set of cost functions (over R+). Given




∣∣∣[0,∑i∈I] , c ∈ C} ,
as it is a closed convex set of B Banach, capturing the costs over all possible flow. In turn, this allows to
define properly stochastic costs,
Definition B.2 (Stochastic costs). Given a graph G, a demand d, an event space (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄) and a family
of costs C, the set of µ̄-Bochner measurable and bounded function on Ω with values in Cd, is called the
stochastic closure of the family C with demand d, noted C∗d(µ). Stochastic costs are the elements of C∗d(µ).
So, when we write stochastic costs (f, ω) 7→ c(f, ω), we actually mean,
c : Ω → Cd
ω 7→ (f 7→ c(f, ω)).
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To avoid all confusion, in this section, and only in this section, we adopt the most correct notation: for c
stochastic cost, c(ω)(f) instead of c(f, ω), so that c(ω) is a cost function. When we say a stochastic cost c is












Proposition B.3. Let d be a demand (over a graph G), (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄) be an event space and C a family of
costs. Let then µ be a posterior, namely a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to the prior,
µ µ̄, and c ∈ C∗d(µ̄) be a stochastic cost. Then, Eµ[c(ω)] is a cost function of Cd.
Proof. First, c is µ-Bochner measurable: by definition it is approximable µ̄-almost everywhere by a se-
quence of measurable countably-valued functions, thus it is approximable µ-almost everywhere. Further-
more, ‖c(ω)‖ ≤ C for all ω ∈ Ω, so ‖c‖ is µ-Lebesgue integrable (µ is finite), therefore c is Bochner integrable.





It is easy to check that Eµ[c(ω)] is nonnegative and nondecreasing. For the continuity, a dominated conver-
gence theorem would do. However, we do not just want to check it is a cost function, but show it belongs to
Cd. Intuitively, it should be true since Cd is closed convex, we are expecting uncountable convex combinations
of elements of Cd to remain in Cd.
Let ε > 0, by definition of Bochner integrability, there exists g an integrable simple function such that,
∫
Ω






for some n positive integer, gi elements of B and
⊔n





























This proposition enables us to consider expected costs. When a driver receives information, he updates
his prior µ̄ to a posterior µ  µ̄, and needs to compute all Eµ[ce(·, ω)] to compare his options. In turn,
this will also allow to define Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, a relevant notion of Wardrop equilibrium when
all drivers share a common belief.
Definition B.4 (Stochastic network). The quadruple N = (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)), where G a graph, d a
demand over G, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄) a probability space and c a set of stochastic costs of some stochastic family, is
called a stochastic network. The set of stochastic networks with costs in C is denoted as,
N ∗(C),
and is precisely the set of quadruples (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) where G is a graph, d a demand over G,
(Ω,B(Ω), µ̄) a probability space and c ⊂ C∗d(µ̄) stochastic costs.
Remark B.5. If C∗d(µ̄) depends on µ̄ and we might want to change the prior, there is usually a ‘greater’
probability measure λ such that all the considered priors µ̄ are absolutely continuous with respect to λ,
namely µ̄ λ. For example the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] or the uniform distribution on finite sets. Then,
we restrict costs to C∗d(λ).
In proposition 3.3, the full-information case is not exactly as simple as depicted. Sure for all ω ∈ Ω,
the network is a deterministic network, Wardrop equilibria exists and are essentially unique, which defines
Ψ(f◦(ω), ω). But we need to assume costs are bounded to guarantee ω 7→ Ψ(f◦(ω), ω) is integrable.
Proposition B.6. Let N = (G, d, c, (Ω,B(Ω), µ̄)) be a stochastic network, with costs c ⊂ C∗(µ̄) for some
family of costs C. Then, for all ω ∈ Ω, the network N(ω), with costs (ce(ω))e∈E , is a deterministic network.









There exist a measurable selection function f◦ : Ω→ ∆(P), which associates a Wardrop equilibrium of N(ω)
to each ω, and likewise, a measurable selection function f◦ : Ω → ∆(P), which associates an optimal flow
of N(ω) to each ω
Proof. We define, for all ω ∈ Ω,
φ(ω) , arg min
f∈∆(P)
Φ(ω)(f).
Since Φ is continuous, and the constraint set is compact, φ(ω) is a closed nonempty set for all ω ∈ Ω. By
Kuratowski–Ryll-Nardzewski measurable selection theorem [7], the multifunction φ admits a measurable
selection which we denote by f◦. Likewise for optimal flows, defining,
ψ(ω) , arg min
f∈∆(P)
Ψ(ω)(f),
there exists a measurable selection, noted f∗, of ψ.
This proposition justifies that ω 7→ Ψ(f◦(ω), ω) is measurable, and since it is bounded, integrable against
the probability measure µ̄, likewise for ω 7→ Ψ(f∗(ω), ω).
In the following, we will refer to stochastic costs in C, instead of stochastic costs in C∗d(µ̄) since d and µ̄
will be fixed. We also return to the original notation c(f, ω), now that we have verified everything is well
defined.
B.2 On Bayesian plausibility
Proof of lemma 3.8, [20]. Once σ is picked, the induced distribution of beliefs satisfies for all Borel measur-
able function φ over Ω,
∫
Ω










Eτ [µm] = µ̄.
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Furthermore, for all A measurable set of Ω,
P[A] = µ̄(A) = 0 =⇒ P[A |m] = µm(A) = 0.
Conversely, let τ, (µm)m∈M be a distribution of beliefs satisfying (3.1) and µm  µ̄ for all m ∈ M . By the


































P[m |ω]P[dω] = 1
τ(m)
σω(m) dµ̄(ω) = dµm(ω),
so that σ indeed induces τ, (µm)m∈M .
B.3 On persuasiveness
Proof of lemma 3.14. First, since,











and for all p of positive probability,
E[cp(f(ω), ω)− cp′(f(ω), ω) |p] =
∫
Ω








fp(ω)[cp(f(ω), ω)− cp′(f(ω), ω)] dµ̄(ω).
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Thus, for all i ∈ I, and all p, p′ ∈ Pi, if P[p] > 0,




fp(ω)[cp(f(ω), ω)− cp′(f(ω), ω)] dµ̄(ω) ≤ 0,
and otherwise, P[p] = 0, the latter is always true anyway. In turn we can rewrite the persuasiveness condition
(3.3) as,
∀i ∈ I, ∀p, p′∈ Pi,
∫
ω∈Ω
fp(ω)[cp(f(ω), ω)− cp′(f(ω), ω)] dµ̄(ω) ≤ 0.
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Appendix C
A worst comparison between full and
no information
End of the proof of proposition 4.6. kn is the sum of n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables of parameter
x
d ,





















so the first term of the numerator converges to 12dc(d). A concentration inequality will help us quantify the






















































































Further, for n large enough,
1
2































(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
,
so that for all c ∈ C and d ≥ x ≥ 0,
ρfini(C) ≥
dc(d)
(d− x)c(d) + xc(x)
,
thus by definition 2.21 and theorem 2.25,
ρfini(C) ≥ α(C) = ρ(C).
And as we noted in proposition 3.3, for all N ∈ N (C),
V fi(N) ≤ ρ(C)V ∗(N) ≤ ρ(C)V ni(N),
so that ρfini(C) ≤ ρ(C), therefore ρfini(C) = ρ(C).
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